Abstract. In this paper we introduce the class of simple games with several ordered levels of approval in the input and in the output -the ð j; kÞ simple games -and propose a definition for weighted games in this context. Abstention is treated as a level of input approval intermediate to votes of yes and no. Our main theorem provides a combinatorial characterization, in terms of what we call grade trade robustness, of weighted ð j; kÞ games within the class of all ð j; kÞ simple games. We also introduce other subclasses of ð j; kÞ simple games and classify several examples. For example, we show the existence of a weighted representation for the UNSC, seen as a voting system in which abstention is permitted.
Background and summary
In modeling the type of voting intended to register collective approval or disapproval of a proposal, the literature on voting systems has confined itself almost exclusively to the mathematical structure known as a simple game (or simple voting game). In a simple game, a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo, the players or voters vote in Soc Choice Welfare (2003) We suspect that one factor that may have hindered the study of games with multiple levels of approval is the absence of a completely satisfactory definition of weighed voting in this context. Indeed, this gap partly explains our interest in the subject.
In the ð j; kÞ simple games we introduce here, each individual voter expresses one of j possible levels of input support, and the output consists of one of k possible levels of collective support. Standard simple games, then, are ð2; 2Þ simple games, while ð3; 2Þ simple games allow each voter a middle option, which may be interpreted as ''I abstain.'' An important but isolated earlier work on abstention can be found in Fishburn (see [Fis1] , pp. 53-55). Fishburn's context can be viewed as a special case of our ð j; kÞ games (in which j ¼ 3 ¼ k, the game is constant-sum, and the intermediate output level of approval is only achieved when the vote is tied exactly), and his definition of weighted game then coincides with the restriction of our definition to this special case. More recently, several works by Felsenthal and Machover (see [FM1] , [FM2] and [FM3] ) have been devoted to the study of voting systems with abstention. These authors argue the importance of taking abstention seriously, critique some justifications that others have offered for disregarding abstentions, and outline the rudiments of a theory of a priori voting power with abstention. Their ''ternary voting rules'' correspond to our ð3; 2Þ simple games. In the alternative model proposed by Braham and Steffen ([BS]) abstention does not really figure as expressing an intermediate or even indeterminate degree of support between ''yes'' and ''no.'' Instead, a sequential structure is proposed in which voters first choose between participation and abstention, and then those participating choose ''yes'' or ''no.'' Lindner [Lin1] compares the Felsenthal and Machover approach to that of Braham and Steffan, and also discusses, in [Lin2], a special class of ð j; kÞ games she terms the Multi-Partition Games. We discuss this class in Sect. 2.
